Approved For Release 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP79T00826A003200080001-2

in ba Jul 1966

July 1966 OCI No. 1767/66

**Copy** № 412

## Current Intelligence Country Handbook

## **CUBA**



This revision supersedes the handbook dated July 1965, copies of which should be destroyed.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Archival Record.

Relieve to EArchives

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Exclusive decord.

Approved For Release 2002/01/03: CIA-RDP79T00826A003200080001-2

### **CUBA**

### 1. Political

The regime of Fidel Castro is solidly entrenched and the stringent security system effectively discourages all but scattered and relatively ineffective action by the small minority of Cubans willing to take the risk of opposing the regime. Most Cubans appear apathetic toward the regime and Western observers in Cuba have noted a growing sense of hopelessness among anti-Castro elements. Fidel Castro's complete personal predominance in the regime and the regime's heavy dependence on his charismatic appeal for forward movement, however, continue to be major vulnerabilities. There are signs, in fact, that Castro's charisma is beginning to fade, and that an air of uncertainty is prevalent in Havana at the present time. The situation could change rapidly if Castro suddenly died or became incapacitated, but in this eventuality it is expected that his brother Raul, who is armed forces chief and second secretary of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), would initially emerge as the dominant political figure. Raul's position would be weaker than Fidel's has been, however, and sooner or later a struggle for power would be likely.

Cuba's political machine, the PCC, which is modeled after parties in other Communist countries, has been in the process of development for more than five years. With a carefully selected membership of about 50,000 drawn from Castro's most militant supporters, the party is grounded more in unsophisticated adulation for Castro than in any overriding attachment to Communist ideological tenets. About two-thirds of the party's central committee and a quarter of the rank and file are made up of members of the armed forces. By thus linking the party and the military establishment so closely, the Castro regime has diminished the possibility of a polarization of its two most important bulwarks.

Organization of the party is still in progress; Castro has stated that its first national congress will be held late in 1966. At the national level the party is made up of a 100-man central committee, a secretariat, a political bureau, and five standing committees (Education, Economic, Foreign Affairs, Constitutional Studies, and Revolutionary Armed Forces and State Security). The lower echelons, in descending order, consist of six provincial directorates, 55 regional directorates, 133 municipal (urban) and 215 sectional (rural) committees,

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

1

and more than 5,000 cells varying from 5 to 200 members each. The number of organizational units below the provincial level is constantly changing as the construction of the party continues.

Party influence is transmitted to the people via the various "organizations of the masses" which directly or indirectly affect the life of every citizen. These organizations, with party members in all key positions, include the Revolutionary Cuban Workers' Central (CTC-R), the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), the Federation of University Students (FEU), the Union of Secondary Students (UES), the Association of Small Farmers (ANAP), and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). The Union of Cuban Pioneers (UPC), for children from 6 to 13 years, and the Union of Communist Youth (UJC), for ages 14 to 27 have the task of grooming the "most exemplary" youth for eventual party membership.

Party factionalism erupted in March 1962 when it became apparent that "old" Communists, those who had joined the pre-Castro Communist Party (PSP) long before the 1959 Revolution, were threatening Castro's control of the regime. In a savage public denunciation, Castro attacked the "old guard" and initiated a wide-ranging purge to remove the undesirable elements and re-establish his own hegemony. Such was his success that by the end of 1965 factionalism in the Cuban leadership was at its lowest point since the regime came to power.

### 2. Economic

The economic situation in general continues to be the Castro regime's greatest weakness. Mismanagement, inefficiency, and low labor productivity continue to exist although many personnel and organizational changes are improving the situation in some important sectors. The regime's early plans which placed excessive emphasis on industrial expansion have been revised and the basic importance of agriculture to the Cuban economy has again been recognized. "Che" Guevara, one-time chief economic planner, has disappeared from the scene along with several of his adherents and his policies have been largely discredited. Greatest emphasis is now on increased sugar production. By 1970 the regime expects to harvest an annual crop of ten million metric tons through expanded sugar cane plantings, mechanization, and greater use of fertilizers.

At present, the Cuban economy is heavily dependent on the largesse of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. Cuba's cumulative debt for Soviet economic credits, as of February 1966, was more than \$800 million. In addition, \$600 to \$800 million dollars worth of military equipment has been delivered on a grant or credit basis.

2 **–** Cuba

Finally, the USSR has extended an additional \$200 million in economic development credits which are still unutilized. Soviet-Cuban trade for 1966 is expected to total an exchange of \$825 million worth of goods, an increase of 10 percent over 1965. The USSR now accounts for about 50 percent of Cuba's foreign trade and is committed to accepting increasing amounts of sugar at a set price of six cents a pound through 1970.

Most of the remainder of Cuba's foreign trade is with Communist China and the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Far East. Cuba, however, retains many trade ties with the free world, notably with Britain, Spain, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Morocco, the UAR, and Japan.

Cuba imports virtually all of its fuels, more than 80 percent of its capital goods, and about 40 percent of its industrial raw materials and foodstuffs. Sugar and its byproducts account for about 85 percent of Cuban exports with nickel and tobacco next in importance.

Cuba harvested slightly over 6 million metric tons of sugar in 1965, but the 1966 harvest fell to slightly less than 4.5 million metric tons due to a severe drought during the growing season. Despite efforts to boost food production during 1965, the "year of agriculture," certain food products are still in short supply. Rice, one of the mainstays of the Cuban diet, is in very short supply due to Cuba's political difficulties with Communist China, the island's chief source of import rice. In January, the rice ration was cut from 6 to 3 pounds per person per month. Consumer goods and spare parts are also in short supply.

The Cuban economy is still subject to the sharp fluctuations which have characterized it since the revolution. In 1965, gross domestic product stood 7 percent above that of 1957, the peak pre-revolution year. In 1966, however, gross domestic product is expected again to fall back to about the level of 1957. The economy is expected to recover this loss next year but future progress probably will be slow.

#### 3. International Relations

Castro has proclaimed 1966 as the "Year of Solidarity." Ironically, little more than a month of the year had passed before the Cuban premier made two blistering denunciations of Cuba's ally, Communist China, accusing the Chinese of "economic crimes" and unauthorized distribution of propaganda to the Revolutionary Armed Forces. This split, partly a reflection of the Sino-Soviet polemic, has plunged Cuban-Chinese relations to their lowest point since Castro assumed power, although a formal diplomatic break is not expected.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Relations with the Soviet Union, on the other hand, are relatively good. Although Castro takes pains to assert his independence publicly and differs from the Russians in revolutionary methodology, he has demonstrated that he fully appreciates the strength of the economic ties binding him to Moscow. He can be expected to continue his support of the Soviet Union in international matters for the foreseeable future.

Castro's attitude toward the United States remains adamant; he has set obviously unacceptable terms to be met before any rapprochement is possible. He has been particularly critical of "US imperialist aggression" in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. The Tri-Continent Conference, held in Havana in January 1966 and attended by more than 80 revolutionary groups from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, heightened the current tone of Castro's anti-US posture. The fight against "imperialism," most specifically US "imperialism" in Vietnam, was the main topic of the meeting. The conference passed resolutions expressing full support for Hanoi and the National Liberation Front and created a 12-member committee "to promote, increase, and coordinate national liberation and fighting movements" and lend them "moral, political, and material aid." After offering "to contribute to the strengthening of the defenses of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam," Castro, in a speech closing the conference, expressed Cuba's readiness to send Cuban troops "to fight against imperialism in any part of the world."

Although the team of about 200 Cuban military advisers which served in the Congo (Kinshasa) in the summer and fall of 1965 has apparently returned to Havana, Castro has not abandoned his revolutionary aspirations regarding Africa. On 3 December 1965, Radio Havana inaugurated daily propaganda broadcasts to "Black" Africa in Spanish, French, English, and Portuguese and during the Tri-Continent Conference Amilcar Cabral, secretary general of the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, was singled out for preferential treatment. At least 300 Cubans are known to be serving as military advisers in the Congo (Brazzaville) and further Cuban participation in African revolutionary activities is expected, probably in the form of financial and propaganda support and guerrilla training.

Urging violent revolution in Latin America continues to be a key regime policy. During his closing speech at the Tri-Continent Conference, Castro praised the rebel groups conducting guerrilla warfare in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Guatemala, and emphasized: "We believe that on this continent, in the case of all or almost all

4 - Cuba

peoples, the battle will take on the most violent forms." Following the conference, the Latin American delegates met separately, and on 18 January Cuba announced the formation of a Latin American Solidarity Organization with headquarters in Havana. The organization is charged with using "all means available to support liberation movements" and has a nine-member committee created to cooperate with the "most active anti-imperialist groups with extensive popular roots." However, there has been little evidence that Cuba has actually given meaningful support to such groups so far this year. Thus there is reason to believe that Castro will try to exploit revolutionary opportunities arising in Latin America only if there is a reasonable prospect for success. Cuba will continue to give limited financial and considerable propaganda support to selected Latin American insurgent groups; continued training in guerrilla warfare techniques and in political indoctrination will be given to some Latin American activists.

Cuba is a "suspended" member of the Organization of American States (OAS) and does not participate in OAS proceedings. In Latin America, only Mexico still maintains diplomatic relations with Cuba,

### 4. Subversion

The Cuban Government is not entirely immune to internal resistance. Attempts at assassination or sabotage on a small scale have been reported from time to time during the past year. The Department of State Security (DSE), which is charged with counterintelligence responsibilities, has, however, achieved such a high state of proficiency that opposition to the regime has been shattered. The Fight Against Bandits (LCB), a military force that works closely with the DSE, has cleared the hills and mountains where bands of dissidents used to roam in the early 1960s, and the Frontier Guard Force (FGF) keeps a watch over ports and the coastline. In the populated areas, the ubiquitous Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) permeate the affairs of everyday life and keep the DSE well informed of any suspicious activity or signs of discontent. Recognizing their impotence in the face of such powerful and well organized organs of suppression, those disaffected elements which would normally form the core of an insurgent or "underground" movement have chosen exile rather than resistance.

Castro's counterinsurgency forces have quickly and capably stifled any serious internal challenges to the regime's stability and can be expected to continue this pattern in the future.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

### 5. Military

Cuba has one of the largest and most modern military establishments in Latin America. The Cuban Armed Forces comprise an Army, Navy, Air and Air Defense Force, and a Popular Defense Militia, all under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MINFAR). The armed forces minister is Raul Castro, second secretary of the Cuban Communist Party and younger brother of Fidel. Although the primary mission of the armed forces is defense from external attack and from internal subversion, troops are sometimes used to aid in the sugar harvest or for civic construction projects. Obligatory military service for those males between the ages of 16 and 26 was started in March 1964 with draftees serving a total of three years. A small force of 1,000 to 2,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians remains in Cuba but all weapons systems, including those with ground-to-ground, ground-to-air, and cruise missiles, are now under Cuban control. The 23 active SAM sites and four coastal defense cruise missile sites have been grouped to provide maximum protection to major populated areas and military installations—especially in the Havana area. Some 134 MIG jet fighters are based at the four major military airfields: San Antonio de los Banos near Havana, San Julian in western Pinar del Rio Province, Camilo Cienfuegos near Camaguey, and Holguin. An estimated 1,200 anti-aircraft artillery pieces, ranging from 12.7mm machine guns to 100mm cannon, and 270 air defense radars (28 fire-control radars) complement the MIGs and missiles in the island's air defense system.

Naval facilities afloat comprise 12 KOMAR guided missile patrol craft based in the Havana-Mariel-Cabanas area and a conglomeration of light surface vessels (motor torpedo boats, patrol craft, and sub-chasers) stationed mainly in the same area on the north coast, at Cienfuegos on the south coast, and at Siguanea on the Isle of Pines. The four coastal defense cruise missile sites, armed with KENNEL surface-to-surface missiles for use against shipping, and the 19 coastal defense radar installations are also believed to be under the control of the navy.

The naval vessels acquired by Cuba from the United States prior to Castro's accession to power are located at bases throughout the island and reportedly are often out of service for lack of repairs and maintenance. They apparently are used primarily for training and for light patrol work and probably will be gradually deactivated. They include an ancient (1912) 2,000-ton auxiliary vessel (rated by the Cuban navy as a "cruiser"), three World War II 1,430-ton US

6 – Cuba

#### 

"Tacoma" class patrol escorts (rated as "frigates"), and about 25 small patrol craft.

Ground forces are equipped with an estimated 785 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns, 260 other armored vehicles, 8 FROG (free-rocket-over-ground) rocket launchers, 100 ground-to-ground versions of the KENNEL cruise missile, and about 1,230 field artillery pieces and anti-tank guns. Almost all of the military hardware was provided by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

The Cuban armed forces probably are in a relatively high state of preparedness and, short of a major US invasion, could successfully defend the country against external attack. They have already proven their capability to maintain internal order. Joint military training exercises, including elements of the ground, sea, and air forces, have been conducted and some ground units have had practical experience in counterinsurgency operations. Although there have been unconfirmed reports of poor morale, there is no reason to doubt that the majority of the regular troops are loyal to the regime. Their principal drawback is a lack of combat experience.

### Chronology of Key Events

- 1953 (26 July) Fidel Castro leads abortive attack on Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba.
- 1956 (2 December) Fidel Castro lands in Oriente Province with 82-man invasion force quickly reduced to 12 men.
- 1959 (1 January) Batista flees; Castro's underground militia in Havana emerges to seize control of the city and halt rioting and looting.
- 1959 (2 January) Castro, in Santiago de Cuba, proclaims provisional government headed by President Urrutia.
  - (16 February) Fidel Castro assumes office as Prime Minister following resignation of Jose Miro Cardona.
- 1960 (4 February) Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan in Cuba heading a 41-man delegation; trade and aid agreements signed.
  - (7 May) Resumption of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the USSR announced.
  - (28 August) Foreign Minister Roa defiantly leads Cuban delegation out of the Seventh Meeting of American Foreign Ministers in San Jose, Costa Rica; the meeting "condemned emphatically the intervention . . . by an extracontinental power in the affairs of the American republics. . . ."

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

- 1961 (3 January) The United States breaks diplomatic relations with Cuba.
  - (17 April) Anti-Castro forces land at Bay of Pigs and Playa Giron; the invaders are overwhelmed and fighting ceases by 19 April.
  - (2 December) Fidel Castro proclaims himself a Marxist-Leninist "until the day I die."
- 1962 (22–31 January) The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of American Foreign Ministers in Punta del Este, Uruguay, excludes Cuba from the OAS.
  - (7 February) US embargo on trade with Cuba.
  - (26 March) Fidel Castro publicly attacks Anibal Escalante, veteran Communist leader, for attempting to build up a personal power machine.
  - (2 July) Raul Castro arrives in Moscow for a 15-day visit.
  - (26 July) First of a series of Soviet vessels bringing an unprecedented quantity of Soviet military equipment and personnel arrives in Cuba.
  - (15 October) Analysis of photos taken on 14 October confirms the presence of Soviet medium-range missiles near San Cristobal.
  - (22 October) President Kennedy orders a "quarantine" on all offensive weapons for Cuba.
  - (27 October) A U-2 plane shot down over Cuba.
  - (28 October) Khrushchev informs President Kennedy that he has ordered work on the bases stopped and the missiles crated and returned to the USSR; UN representatives to be permitted to "verify the dismantling."
- 1962 (2 November) Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan in Cuba for talks with Castro.
  - (20 November) US quarantine terminated after President Kennedy amounced that all known offensive missile sites in Cuba had been dismantled and that Khrushchev had assured him that all IL–28 bombers would be withdrawn from Cuba within 30 days.
- 1963 (27 April) Fidel Castro begins 37-day state visit in the USSR. (4 October) Second Law of Agrarian Reform nationalizes all remaining independent farms larger than five caballerias (167 acres).
  - (3–8 October) Cuba struck by Hurricane Flora, one of the worst natural disasters in the island's history.

8 - Cuba

1963 (1 November) Venezuelan authorities announce the discovery of a large cache of weapons of Cuban origin.

of a large cache of weapons of Cuban origin.

(1 December) Draft law on compulsory military service goes into effect; provides for three year service for all male Cubans between the ages of 17 and 45.

(27 December) Nationwide system of work norms and standardized wage scales to be applied in Cuba beginning the

first of 1964.

1964

(13 January) Fidel Castro arrives in Moscow; Premier Khrushchev announces the new Soviet-Cuban long-term trade and sugar agreement; joint Cuban-Soviet communique issued in Moscow on 22 January states that "complete unity of views was confirmed on all questions discussed."

(2 February) Four Cuban fishing boats violate US territorial waters and are detained by US Coast Guard; Cuba retaliates by severing the water supply to the Guantanamo

Naval Base on 6 February.

(23–30 March) The highly publicized and politically explosive second trial of Marcos Rodriguez again revealed deep divisions between the "old" and the "new" Communists in the regime.

(23 March–16 June) Che Guevara heads Cuban delegation at UN Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva.

- (20 April) Two Cuban protest notes delivered to US; one protesting alleged provocations from the Guantanamo Naval Base, and the other warning that the US would bear "exclusive responsibility" for any "dangerous situation" resulting from continued "spy flights over Cuban territory."
- (27 June) Alberto Mora ousted as foreign trade minister and replaced by Marcelo Fernandez Font.
- (3 July) Ministry of the Sugar Industry established.
- (21–26 July) Ninth Meeting of American Foreign Ministers in Washington resolves that OAS members shall not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with the Castro regime; that they shall suspend all trade except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical supplies; and that all sea transportation with Cuba be suspended.
- (22 July) President Dorticos named Minister of Economy and director of JUCEPLAN, replacing Regino Boti.
- (5-12 October) President Dorticos heads Cuban delegation to nonaligned nations conference in Cairo; briefly visits

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

- 1964 Algeria and Moscow where his visit coincides with Khrushchev's ouster.
  - (22–29 November) Meeting of Latin American Communist leaders in Havana.
  - (8 December) Minister of Labor Martinez Sanchez ousted from his post for "grave administrative errors" and, the government announced, reacted by attempting suicide.
  - (18 December) Che Guevara arrives in Algeria to begin a three month mission to various African countries and Peking.
  - (6–22 December) Carlos Rafael Rodriguez travels to Moscow and Peking.
- 1965 (15 February) Carlos Rafael Rodriguez reassigned as minister without portfolio; Fidel Castro assumes presidency of INRA.
  - (1 March) Raul Castro and Osmani Cienfuegos attend meeting of world Communist parties in Moscow.
  - (18 May) Cuban military advisers arrive in Dar es Salaam to begin training of "freedom fighters" for guerrilla warfare in the Congo.
  - (19 June) Cuban IL-14 transport plane shot down by surface-to-air missile near Jaruco.
  - (30 June) Cuba's press office in Algiers closed down in aftermath of Boumediene's anti-Ben Bella coup.
  - (28 September) Castro makes public his offer to permit Cubans to emigrate to the United States.
  - (1 October) The 100-man central committee of the Cuban Communist Party named.
  - (2 October) Castro publicly reads letter purportedly written by Che Guevara in which Guevara resigned all official positions because "other lands of the world demand my modest efforts."
  - (7 October) Raul Castro arrives in Odessa for his fourth visit to the Soviet Union. He later makes side visits to East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
  - (19–24 October) Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visits Havana.
  - (1 December) Airlift of refugees to Miami starts in implementation of Castro's 28 September offer to permit emigration.
- 1966 (2 January) Castro accuses Communist China of reneging on rice deal.

10 - Cuba

1966	(3-15 January) Representatives of revolutionary groups
	from Africa, Asia, and Latin America meet in Havana at
	the Tri-Continent Conference to attack US "imperialism"
	and express support for "national liberation" movements.

(18 January) Cuba announces the formation of the Latin American Solidarity Organization to cooperate with the "most active anti-imperialist groups."

(6 February) Castro denounces Peking for attempting the subversion of Cuban military personnel and repeats his accusation concerning the rice agreement.

### Holidays and Significant Dates

1 January	Celebration of Batista's downfall (1959)
28 January	Anniversary of the birth of Jose Marti (1853)
24 February	Anniversary of the "Grito de Baire" opening the final war for freedom from Spain (1895)
13 March	Anniversary of the students' attack on the Presidential Palace (1957)
19 April	Anniversary of the victory of Playa Giron (defeat of Bay of Pigs invasion—1961)
1 May	May Day
26 July	Anniversary of Castro's Moncada Barracks attack opening the fight against Batista (1953)
30 July	Day of Revolutionary Martyrs (anniversary of death of rebel leader Frank Pais—1957)
10 October	Anniversary of the beginning of the Wars for Independence (1868)
27 November	Day of Student Mourning (anniversary of execution of medical students—1871)
7 December	Day of Mourning for National Martyrs (anniversary of the death of General Antonio Maceo—1896)

### Selected Factual Data

#### LAND

Total sq. miles: 44,220; 64% arable, of which only 25% is cultivated; 14% forested; 22% mountains and other

### PEOPLE

Population: 7.1 million; density, 160 per sq. mile; males 15–49, 1.7 million; fit for military service, 855,000 (Feb. 1962)

### SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Ethnic groups: 51% mulatto; 37% white; 11% Negro; 1% Chinese

Religion: nominally Roman Catholic

Language: Spanish Literacy: 90%

Labor force: 2.5 million

Organized labor: 60% of total force

### **GOVERNMENT**

Type of government: totalitarian Communist

Branches of government: executive; controlled judiciary; no legislature

Leader: Premier Fidel Castro Ruz

Government attitude towards US: hostile

Capital: Havana

Regional breakdown: six provinces

Political parties and leaders: Cuban Communist Party (CCP) still in the process of organization; First Secretary Fidel Castro Ruz, Second Secretary Raul Castro Ruz

Other political groups: over 400 competing factions in exile, mainly in the US; some claim clandestine membership inside Cuba

Member: UN and specialized agencies: OAS (non-participant); Postal Union of the Americas and Spain; GATT; International Sugar Council; International Wheat Agreement; International Rice Commission; Permanent Court of Arbitration; observer status in CEMA

Next election: none scheduled

#### **ECONOMY**

GNP: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) \$3,045 million in 1965; increased about 7% over 1964; US\$430 per capita for 1965 in 1957 prices

Rate of inflation: inflation exists—evidenced by black-market activities—but is suppressed by price control and rationing

Agriculture: sugar, tobacco, coffee, corn, rice, beans, potatoes, tubers, tropical fruits

Major industries: sugar, food and tobacco processing, textiles, chemicals, paper and wood products, electric power, petroleum refining, minerals

Critical shortages: spare parts for Western-made machinery; almost all kinds of consumer goods

Electric power: 976,000 kw capacity (1965); 2.51 billion kw-hr produced (est. for 1965)

12 - Cuba

Government revenue: 85–90% of foreign earnings derived from sale of sugar and byproducts

Exports: (1964 figures) sugar and sugar byproducts (86%) \$670 million; minerals (6%) \$40 million; tobacco (4%) \$30 million; other (4%) \$28 million

Imports: (1965 estimates) food (23%) \$210 million; other consumer goods (5%) \$35 million; raw materials and semi-finished goods (24%) \$230 million; fuels (8%) \$75 million; capital goods (40%) \$380 million

Exports to US in 1965: negligible

Imports from US in 1965: negligible

Trade/aid: unfavorable balance of trade; Communist countries provided an estimated 79% (\$735 million) of imports in 1965; est. total trade in 1965 \$1,590 million; US\$510 million development credits from Communist countries

US direct private investment: \$1,000,000,000 confiscated

Exchange rate: no exchange rate, but previously 1 peso equaled US\$1

### **COMMUNICATIONS**

Railroads: about 2,400 standard gage common carrier lines and about 6,090 miles of industrial lines

Highways: 8,300 miles; 61% surfaced, 39% earth

Inland waterways: none of significance

Ports: one principal (Havana), five secondary, 167 minor

Merchant marine: 30 ships totaling about 130,000 GRT

Airfields: 50 civil (2 international) airfields; 11 seaplane stations Telecommunications: good domestic and international facilities

### **DEFENSE FORCES**

Personnel: army, 90,000 regulars and 85,000 ready reserve; navy, 7,000; air force, 4,000; ground-based air defense personnel, 8,000; militia, 100,000

Loyalty to government: majority believed loyal

Major ground units: 3 independent territorial commands with an estimated 49 subordinate divisions

Missiles: 600 SAM's and 23 active SAM sites; 8 FROG rocket launchers; 50 KENNEL cruise missiles at 4 coast defense sites; 100 ground-to-ground KENNEL missiles; 12 KOMAR-class cruise missile boats

Armor: 785 tanks and self-propelled guns; 260 other armored vehicles

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Cuba — 13

Artillery: 1,230 field pieces and antitank guns; 1,200 antiaircraft guns

Ships: 12 KOMAR-class cruise missile boats; 6 Khronstadt-class subchasers; 6 SO-1 class subchasers; 12 P-6 class motor torpedo boats; 12 P-4 class motor torpedo boats; 1 2,000 ton "cruiser" (auxiliary vessel built in 1912); 3 "frigates" (1,430 ton US-built World War II patrol escorts); 2 patrol escorts; 55 miscellaneous patrol craft and auxiliary and service vessels

Aircraft: 134 jet fighter planes (83 MIG-15/17's, 11 MIG-19's, 40 MIG-21's); 95 helicopters; 32 transport planes (with 28 in reserve); 150 trainer-liaison planes

Air facilities: 4 major military airfields

Supply: dependent upon foreign sources; pre-1958 equipment from the free world, equipment now supplied by Communist countries

US missions: none

US military aid: none

Total military budget: approximately 10% (US\$213,200,000) of the 1965 national budget

## RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Resident diplomatic missions: all Communist countries

Consular missions: Soviet Union has a consular mission in Santiago de Cuba

Permanent commercial missions: all

Number of binational cultural centers: binational cultural agreements with all

Exports in 1965: \$510 million (est. 76% of total exports)

Imports in 1965: \$735 million (est. 79% of total imports)

### National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Material

The following sections of the NIS are relevant:

NIS Area 78 (Cuba)

GENERAL SURVEY (March 1966) and the following specialized sections:

Sec 22 Coasts and Landing Beaches—August 1963

Sec 23 Weather and Climate-May 1959

Sec 25 Urban Areas—February 1964

Sec 31 Railway-March 1963

Sec 32 Highway—April 1963

Sec 35 Ports and Naval Facilities-August 1963

Sec 36 Merchant Marine-January 1963

14 - Cuba

- Sec 37 Civil Air—April 1957
- Sec 38 Telecommunications—August 1961
- Sec 43 Religion, Education, and Public Information-March 1957
- Sec 45 Health and Sanitation—November 1962
- Sec 51 The Constitutional System—November 1962
- Sec 52 Structure of the Government-April 1958
- Sec 53 Political Dynamics—June 1957
- Sec 61 Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry-December 1961
- Sec 62 Fuels and Power-May 1958
- Sec 63 Minerals and Metals-April 1958
- Sec 64 Manufacturing and Construction-June 1961
- Sec 65 Trade and Finance-May 1957
- Sec 91-94 Map and Chart Appraisal—December 1961

Gazetteer

25X1B

## Map

The best available general reference map is: Central Intelligence Agency;  $Cuba;\ 1:1,000,000;\ 1964$ 

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Cuba — 15

### Approved For Release 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP79T00826A003200080001-2

